20 جوان 2022 Il y a 2 years
MEAL OFFICER AND PROJECT MANAGER
Context of the project :
After the Khadafi-era regime change, Libya has lived through numerous political and economic tribulations and the present cycle of civil violence is ending a period of relative stability and peace. While this situation is both unexpected and distressing for the social suffering it causes, it must not distract efforts to rebuild the country after the end of the strife, no matter what the results of the conflict. For the present, the EU4PSL must operate in a manner that is consistent with permanent uncertainty, fast-evolving political conditions and a tremendous difficulty in ensuring local presence / activity.
Overall, Libya’s macro-economic situation remains unchanged through the political upheavals: the economy suffers from these political divisions and the conflict is destroying the recovery that had begun in 2017, on the basis of increased oil production, after oil fields were taken over by the Government.
However dramatic the contingent situation may be, it is contingent: by design, the EU4PSL’s objectives are targeting at more “fundamental” hurdles to economic stability and diversification, which will be applicable in evolving contexts, from the present to the expected future political stability.
1.1 General context
Since 2011, Libya has lived through numerous political and economic tribulations and the present cycle of civil violence is ending a period of relative stability and peace. While this situation is both unexpected and distressing for the social suffering it causes, it must not distract efforts to rebuild the country after the end of the strife, no matter what the results of the conflict. The successful achievements of European Funded project SLEIDSE ( 2017- 2018) program that entrusted to Expertise France for execution encouraged the European Union to fund the EU4PSL( 2019-2023) project which operated in a manner that is consistent with permanent uncertainty, fast-evolving political conditions due to the invading of the Tripoli by the national army that lead by Marchal khalifah Hafter in the 4th of April 2019 which had a tremendous difficulty impacts in ensuring Expertise France local presence / activity as well as travelling of the Libyan stakeholders to Tunis.
Despite to, the epidemic COVID 19 problem that started in March 2019 had a very negative impact on all activities of the program, Expertise France used the online meeting features (Zoom, Teams, and other means) to continue the meetings, workshops and training
After 14 months of a bloody civil war supported by a direct military intervention from international players such as (Turkey, Qatar, Russia, Egypt, and the UAE), the National Army forces left western Libya and controlled Sirte, Al-Jafra, and Sebha.
According to this withdrawal, the United Nations and the international community contributed to the Libyan conflicting parties reaching a ceasefire agreement and launching a political initiative to solve the Libyan crisis through the formation of a political dialogue team from all Libyan parties that reached an agreement for a transitional phase to form a national unity government and setting a date for parliamentary and presidential elections on 24/12/2021.
Overall, Libya’s macro-economic situation remains unchanged through the political upheavals: the economy suffers from these political divisions and the conflict is destroying the recovery that had begun in 2017, on the basis of increased oil production, after oil fields were taken over by the Government.
However dramatic the contingent situation may be, it is contingent: by design, the EU4PSL’s objectives are targeting at more “fundamental” hurdles to economic stability and diversification, which will be applicable in evolving contexts, from the present to the expected future political stability.
1.2 Economic context
Libya is an oil-rich country with a population reaching 6.5 million and a Gross National Income per capita of USD 14,330 (2015). Oil production has shaped decisively the socioeconomic profile of Libya since the 1960s. Government expenditure is the ultimate source of almost all economic activity and has therefore become the object of political and power struggles. Through employment in the public sector and multiple channels of revenue distribution, the majority of Libya’s population is directly or indirectly dependent on government funds. Different networks controlling the allocation of expenditure and public sector jobs have grown over the decades and are at the heart of the political bargaining processes. The private sector is mostly limited to imports, retail and services while foreign migrants provide the bulk of manual labour, notably in agriculture and construction.
In the post-revolutionary years, the Libyan economy suffers from acute political division that does not allow reaching its potential. Following four years of recession, the Libyan economy recovered in 2017, thanks to the resumption in the production of hydrocarbon products, after key oil fields were repossessed from armed groups last year. The return to pre-evolutionary levels of oil production seems unrealistic in the current context with inadequate resources for network maintenance and sporadic attacks by armed groups, still often causing disruption of the daily production capacity.
Natural resource wealth tends to expose resource rich countries to higher political and economic risks. Libya is a clear demonstration of this posit. The conflict has caused a collapse in oil revenues with severe consequences for the capacity of the Libyan institutions to raise public revenues and deliver basic services. According to UN estimates, there are around 400,000 people in need of food assistance, and prices of basic food items, such as bread, have increased 5-fold since 2014. Service delivery has declined severely since 2011. Unemployment has risen sharply with public sector wages remaining the sole source of income for most families.
The volatility of oil prices, unstable oil production, overvalued exchange rates, and political instability all at the same time, discourage investments in non-resource traded goods. This in turn hinders the development of the Libyan private sector and overall economic diversification creating a vicious circle leading to interrelated enduring macroeconomic volatility and stagnating economic diversification. Libya witnessed a sharp decline of activities in non-hydrocarbon sectors in the post-2011 period. Many jobs have been lost and most families depend on public sector salaries, about 65% of all public expenditures in 2016 was going towards wages, a figure which is expected to rise even further in 2018. In fact, more than 1.8 million employees are currently on the government payroll, about half of the working-age population. To compensate for the economic decline and inflation, public salaries have increased four-fold since 2011, which may have relieved short-term social pressures, but is likely to have further exacerbated inflationary pressures. Unemployment is highest among young people of the 15-24 age range, estimated at 44%, according to the World Bank (International Labour Organisation model estimates).
The political landscape in Libya causes significant obstacles to economic recovery, stability and growth. This is coupled with economic policies carrying the legacy of the past, a dominant centralised economic model which gives little room for the development of the private sector. In sectors where the public sector is dominant, private enterprises suffer from unfair competition with public enterprises affecting their productivity and growth prospects. Government controlled sectors such as oil and gas, defence, health, education, social services, and electricity, gas and water supply accounted for over 85.0% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2012. Many other sectors are mostly controlled by public enterprises, although they are small contributors to the GDP. These include transport, storage and telecommunications (3.0% of GDP), financial services (1.4%), and agriculture and fisheries (less than 1.0%).
One major handicap to Libya’s economic development is excessive reliance on both a single source of GDP and excessive control by the State of factors of production. In 2018, government-controlled sectors (hydrocarbon extraction & distribution, defence, health, education, social services, and utilities supply have accounted for over 85% of GDP.
Libya has one of the most undiversified productive structures in the world: hydrocarbons account for 70% of the GDP, more than 95% of exports, approximately 90% of government revenue, and determine decisively the economic performance of the country. The lack of alternative revenue-sources makes Libya very vulnerable to oil price fluctuations or indeed oil blockades. Moreover, the reliance on import of goods makes the economy subject to currency fluctuations and inflationary pressures. These economic fundamentals are strongly hampered by the past history of the country: Jamahiriya-inspired economic policies, a very centralised economic model, low priority given to economic contribution of the private sector.
1.3 Political context
The Libyan Political Agreement signed in December 2015 aimed at bringing the two governments in Tripoli and Tobruk together by forming a Presidential Council in Tripoli and to appoint an interim Government of National Accord (GNA). However, although installed in Tripoli since March 2016, the GNA has never been recognized by the House of Representative, based in Tobruk, which was one of the conditions set by the agreement. The internationally backed GNA continues to struggle for legitimacy and with it to restore security and build institutions that can provide basic services across the country.
Since GNA came into power, the country’s security situation faced several challenges with the worst being in April 2019. This is when a military campaign was launched by the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by General Hafter, to take over the capital, Tripoli. the LNA’s offensive against Tripoli has resulted in an increased destabilization of Libya and completely unpredictable outcomes.
1.4 Private sector context
The private Sector in Libya is dominated by the presence of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). A survey and private sector mapping carried out by the World Bank in 2015 confirms the assumption: 95% of the sample companies are MSMEs, out of which 59% considered small (5-19 employees), 23% medium (20-99 employees) and 13% micro (up to 5 employees).
From the sample, only 8% of the enterprises engaged in exporting activities. There is no official data on the number of MSMEs in Libya. The 2006 Business Census reported a total of 117.828 enterprises, but the figure is likely to have changed drastically since then.
In the OECD area, Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the predominant form of enterprise, accounting for approximately 99% of all firms. They provide the main source of employment, accounting for about 70% of jobs on average, and are major contributors to value creation, generating between 50% and 60% of value added on average. In addition, SME development can contribute to economic diversification and resilience. This is especially relevant for resource-rich countries that are particularly vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations. These figures account for much less in Libya, however they are indicative of the growth prospects and the employment opportunities MSMEs can create in an economy. A targeted policy intervention to improve the conditions for private sector development and employability in Libya should focus on the support to MSMEs.
The private sector on the other hand remains very small, representing only about 5.0% of GDP and about 14.0% of employment (4.0% to 6.0% of employed workers and about 8.6% of self-employed). These are low contributions to the economy by any international standard; private sector share of total values varies greatly, ranging from 90% in the trade sector to 10 % in the finance sector. A small and underdeveloped manufacturing sector representing about 3.2% of GDP in 2012, a construction sector of less than 2% of GDP and a real estate sector of about 5.0% of GDP are comprised of a mix of public and private sector enterprises. The manufacturing sector is largely composed of state-controlled enterprises in heavy industry, with two strong privately driven subsectors, food processing and building materials production.
An integral part that supports the growth of SMEs is through facilitating their access to financing. Several empirical studies have documented a strong and positive link between a financial system’s operations and a country’s economic growth. The financial status increases the probability of performance measures, such as investment and employment. Small businesses have various means to secure financial assistance to boost their capital. Such assistance can be achieved through either informal (i.e., personal savings, families and friends) or formal means (i.e., banks, special funds, intermediators).
Drawn from the experience gained from SLEIDSE programme and other substantial evidence, SMEs in Libya face many growth constraints and have less access to formal sources of external finance, such as banks or the availability of alternative financial institutions. In Libya, banks are often unable or unwilling to give either long- or short-term loans to SMEs. Such a situation could be attributed to a wide range of reasons, including, lack of data about the firm, the firms’ size, age, lack of business strategy, collateral, financial information and bank requirements as well as the owner’s or manager’s educational background and business experience. This is also backed by the fact that banks are the only available source of formal financing in Libya.
According to the latest World Bank annual rating report (2018), Libya is ranked 186 among 190 economies in the ease of doing business. In the same report, the country had the same rank for the ease of accessing credit and in terms of Credit bureau coverage. Venture capital VC and local equity market availability is almost completely absent in the Libyan financial market.
Finally, Informality is a common problem even in advanced economies, but it generally tends to be smaller in countries with a business-friendly regulatory regime, secure property rights and a stable judicial system. A large share of economic activity in Libya belongs to the informal sector, already in 2010 estimated at 30,9%, which is higher than most of the countries of the region with similar income levels. Despite the lack of reliable data, the assumption that this figure has grown in the post-2011 period may hold significant validity.
1.5 Private sector support services
According to the UNDP Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) mapping report, in the wake of the 17 February 2011 uprising in Libya, CSOs were able to proliferate in a newly found participatory climate and their emergence has been inspiring. Across the country, CSOs have been flourishing, with a wide range of civic activists and groups collaborating in areas as varied as human rights democratic dialogue, women’s empowerment, transparency and accountability, service delivery to the poor and civic education and engagement more generally. Given the importance of (CSOs) in the development of an inclusive, democratic and stable society in Libya, several international donors and International Non-Governmental Organizations have been supporting the growth and development of indigenous civil society in Libya.
Between 2017 and 2018, SLEIDSE programme managed to design and implement over 12 bootcamps in Libya and Tunisia with different themes dedicated to supporting Libyan entrepreneurs. Those entrepreneurs who were selected to join SLEIDSE’s bootcamps benefited from acquiring knowledge on how they could; manage their businesses, market their products/services, approach the financial sector to raise funds, build wider relations, formalise their businesses in case they are not, etc.
Unfortunately, once a bootcamp has ended, it was not easy to follow up with an entrepreneur who participated in the bootcamp. As such, there was a lack of sustainability and follow up with the Entrepreneurs when they head back to their everyday life. Additionally, there are no public agencies available to support entrepreneurs once they start their business journey, Libya Enterprise, which is the national public agency for small and medium enterprises showed little interest and no capacity with this regard.
Therefore, filing such a gap with local CSOs through building their capacity in providing quality bootcamps that include monitoring and evaluation services is expected to have an enormous positive impact. Additionally, if this service was available in Libya, more Libyans will have access to it, which in return would lead to a significant increase in entrepreneurial culture within the country.
To tackle some of these issues, Expertise France, the French technical cooperation agency, together with the European Union and in close cooperation with both international and local Libyan partners, have developed a set of targeted activities based on several years of experience in order to improve Libya’s business environment and support the growth of the private sector.
Considering the very volatile environment in Libya, at both political and security level, it is of paramount importance to adopt a flexible approach in implementing the action. Classical long-term planning is not realistic in view of the ever-changing context. It is suggested to review both objectives and achievements every year during the steering committee to allow the necessary operational adaptations in the scope of the activities that would allow reaching the objectives of the action.
Expertise France is working on three projects until 2022 and other projects are in development.
The first project names Private Sector Development Programme. It is a 4-year programme (2019-2023). The ultimate aim of the EU4PSL programme is to improve Libya’s business environment, in order to generate economic growth for private sector and job opportunities for youth and women.
The total budget of the programme is 10 million euros.
The outcomes (components) of the programme are as follows:
Outcome 1: Strengthen the capacities of Libyan institutions to design and implement actions conducive to MSME development and improve the attractiveness of Libyan economy for investments.
Outcome 2: Support youth’s and women’s economic empowerment and start-up entrepreneurship.
Outcome 3: Improve access to finance for MSMEs and start-ups, including innovative financial tools and microfinance.
Outcome 4: Business and Education: Streamline Entrepreneurship within Libyan universities
The second project is Raqam-e, a 2-year project funded by the French government with 1.8m euros and implemented by Expertise France in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Governance and 5 municipalities. It started on the 1st of April 2020.
It supports Libya in its digital transition by allowing young people to access new skills to meet the job market needs of tomorrow.
The project includes three activities:
By the end of the project, 5 coding academies will be delivering coding trainings in 5 municipalities: Benghazi, Janzour, Misrata, Sebha and Tripoli Center with the ambition to train more than 200 young people per year, 50% of whom are women.
In order to stimulate innovation within these coding academies, “Hackathons”, competitions between the coders, will be organized, under the sponsorship of Libyana (Mobile Company).
The objective is that previously acquired skills can be directly used by the private sector. Those events will also be an opportunity to allow the most talented coders to expose their skills to potential recruiters or investors.
Manara will focus on supporting and empowering women by encouraging them in their professional endeavour, especially women with young children. The coworking space will offer to women entrepreneurs with children between 0 to 3 years old – the “mompreneurs” – a place where they can work while their children are being taken care of by qualified nannies. The coworking space team will also organize events allowing mompreneurs to develop their skills and build a professional network.
This bootcamp will gather 12 coding schools (22 participants in total) across Libya that are already competent and experienced in providing coding trainings. The objective is to improve their capacities in coding, communication, and entrepreneurship. By further strengthening their capacities, we want to see them play a more important role within their community. This 3-month online bootcamp will close with a hackathon.
Four parity groups of women / men of 20 people aged between 18 and 30 years old distributed geographically in 4 cities (Benghazi, Misurata, Sebha and Tripoli) will be trained for 6 weeks in Libya in coding, digital marketing and UX design for 4 weeks. Two weeks of training will then be dedicated to the challenges and fundamentals of entrepreneurship and the use of communication tools. At the end of the course, a job fair will be organized in Tripoli, allowing the best participants of each training to meet with investors, businessmen and private sector companies.
The third project is E-Nable, a 3 years-project, funded by the European Union, with 5 M€. The overall objective of the action is therefore to improve the capacities of key economic institutions for sustainable and digital economic recovery and dynamics, in order to institutionalize the economic growth of the private sector, with the support of both private and public sector organizations.
The three objectives and components of the project are described, as follows:
This project seeks to assist the government of Libya and all relevant stakeholders in their efforts to promote development of an open, dynamic and diversified economy in Libya.
The project will contribute concrete and practical assistance to key Libyan stakeholders, who have capacity to accelerate the transition towards:
Outcome 1 (O1): Public policies for economic diversification and enabling business environment are enhanced.
Outputs 1:
Outcome 2 (O2): Digital innovations related to economic governance are taken up among public institutions.
Outputs 2:
Outcome 3 (O3): Services and products provided by financial institutions are improved.
Outputs 3:
The MEAL Officer will have the opportunity to integrate other projects into his/her actual portfolio (projects in development) depending on the integration of new initiative in GEFI EF Libya portfolio.
The MEAL Officer will have the opportunity to integrate other projects into his/her actual portfolio (projects in development) depending on the integration of new initiative in GEFI EF Libya portfolio.
Follow up
Evaluation
Learning
Transversal
Project manager / Monitoring:
Reporting
Project development
– Participation in the drafting of project proposals, review and consolidation;
– Participation in the structuring of provisional budgets in connection with MEAL activities of new programs in development;
– Writing of MEAL chapters of new project / program proposals;
– Organization of meetings with potential partners;
– Setting up of new parallel activities to be included in the framework of the projects (prevention to the fight against corruption, etc.), in link with external partners.
Support for the program manager and the project manager at headquarters
– Support in the follow-up of certain administrative and financial points, in collaboration with the CAM;
– Participation in coordination meetings;
– Taking reports following important meetings and meetings;
– Monitoring of the archiving of projects in collaboration with the team;
– Preparation of agendas and planning of team meetings;
– Coordination with the teams of certain requests from the program manager and/or the project manager at headquarters;
– Feedback from the team to the program manager and / or the project manager at headquarters.
The duty station of the position is Tunis, in the Tunisian Office of Expertise France. Potential travels abroad and to Libya may be required, subject to security conditions.
The service is scheduled to last 2 years: 1st of July 2022 to June 30, 2024.
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